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Humans can see and name thousands of distinct
object and action categories, so it is unlikely that
each category is represented in a distinct brain
area. A more efficient scheme would be to represent
categories as locations in a continuous semantic
space mapped smoothly across the cortical surface.
To search for such a space, we used fMRI tomeasure
human brain activity evoked by natural movies. We
then used voxelwise models to examine the cortical
representation of 1,705 object and action categories.
The first few dimensions of the underlying semantic
space were recovered from the fit models by prin-
cipal components analysis. Projection of the recov-
ered semantic space onto cortical flat maps shows
that semantic selectivity is organized into smooth
gradients that cover much of visual and nonvisual
cortex. Furthermore, both the recovered semantic
space and the cortical organization of the space
are shared across different individuals.
INTRODUCTION
Previous fMRI studies have suggested that some categories of
objects and actions are represented in specific cortical areas.
Categories that have been functionally localized include faces
(Avidan et al., 2005; Clark et al., 1996; Halgren et al., 1999; Kanw-
isher et al., 1997; McCarthy et al., 1997; Rajimehr et al., 2009;
Tsao et al., 2008), body parts (Downing et al., 2001; Peelen
and Downing, 2005; Schwarzlose et al., 2005), outdoor scenes
(Aguirre et al., 1998; Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998), and human
body movements (Peelen et al., 2006; Pelphrey et al., 2005).
However, humans can recognize thousands of different cate-
gories of objects and actions. Given the limited size of the human
brain, it is unreasonable to expect that every one of these cate-
gories is represented in a distinct brain area. Indeed, fMRI
studies have failed to identify dedicated functional areas for
many common object categories including household objects1210 Neuron 76, 1210–1224, December 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc(Haxby et al., 2001), animals and tools (Chao et al., 1999),
food, clothes, and so on (Downing et al., 2006).
An efficient way for the brain to represent object and action
categories would be to organize them into a continuous space
that reflects the semantic similarity between categories. A
continuous semantic space could be mapped smoothly onto
the cortical sheet so that nearby points in cortex would represent
semantically similar categories. No previous study has found
a general semantic space that organizes the representation of
all visual categories in the human brain. However, several studies
have suggested that single locations on the cortical surface
might represent many semantically related categories (Connolly
et al., 2012; Downing et al., 2006; Edelman et al., 1998; Just
et al., 2010; Konkle and Oliva, 2012; Kriegeskorte et al., 2008;
Naselaris et al., 2009; Op de Beeck et al., 2008; O’Toole et al.,
2005). Some studies have also proposed likely dimensions
that organize these representations, such as animals versus
nonanimals (Connolly et al., 2012; Downing et al., 2006; Kriege-
skorte et al., 2008; Naselaris et al., 2009), manipulation versus
shelter versus eating (Just et al., 2010), large versus small (Konkle
and Oliva, 2012), or hand- versus mouth- versus foot-related
actions (Hauk et al., 2004).
To determine whether a continuous semantic space underlies
category representation in the human brain, we collected blood-
oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) fMRI responses from five
subjects while they watched several hours of natural movies.
Natural movies were used because they contain many of the
object and action categories that occur in daily life, and they
evoke robust BOLD responses (Bartels and Zeki, 2004; Hasson
et al., 2004, 2008; Nishimoto et al., 2011). After data collection,
we used terms from the WordNet lexicon (Miller, 1995) to label
1,364 common objects (i.e., nouns) and actions (i.e., verbs) in
the movies (see Experimental Procedures for details of labeling
procedure and see Figure S1 available online for examples of
typical labeled clips). WordNet is a set of directed graphs that
represent the hierarchical ‘‘is a’’ relationships between object
or action categories. The hierarchical relationships in WordNet
were then used to infer the presence of an additional 341
higher-order categories (e.g., a scene containing a dog must
also contain a canine). Finally, we used regularized linear regres-
sion (see Experimental Procedures for details; Kay et al., 2008;
Mitchell et al., 2008; Naselaris et al., 2009; Nishimoto et al.,.
Figure 1. Schematic of the Experiment and Model
Subjects viewed 2 hr of natural movies while BOLD responses weremeasured using fMRI. Objects and actions in themovies were labeled using 1,364 terms from
the WordNet lexicon (Miller, 1995). The hierarchical ‘‘is a’’ relationships defined by WordNet were used to infer the presence of 341 higher-order categories,
providing a total of 1,705 distinct category labels. A regularized, linearized finite impulse response regression model was then estimated for each cortical voxel
recorded in each subject’s brain (Kay et al., 2008; Mitchell et al., 2008; Naselaris et al., 2009; Nishimoto et al., 2011). The resulting category model weights
describe how various object and action categories influence BOLD signals recorded in each voxel. Categories with positive weights tend to increase BOLD, while
those with negative weights tend to decrease BOLD. The response of a voxel to a particular scene is predicted as the sum of the weights for all categories in that
scene.
Neuron
Semantic Representation in the Human Brain2011) to characterize the response of each voxel to each of the
1,705 object and action categories (Figure 1). The linear regres-
sion procedure produced a set of 1,705 model weights for each
individual voxel, reflecting how each object and action category
influences BOLD responses in each voxel.
RESULTS
Category Selectivity for Individual Voxels
Our modeling procedure produces detailed information about
the representation of categories in each individual voxel in the
brain. Figure 2A shows the category selectivity for one voxel
located in the left parahippocampal place area (PPA) of subject
A.V. The model for this voxel shows that BOLD responses are
strongly enhanced by categories associated with man-made
objects and structures (e.g., ‘‘building,’’ ‘‘road,’’ ‘‘vehicle,’’ and
‘‘furniture’’), weakly enhanced by categories associated with
outdoor scenes (e.g., ‘‘hill,’’ ‘‘grassland,’’ and ‘‘geological forma-
tion’’) and humans (e.g., ‘‘person’’ and ‘‘athlete’’), and weakly
suppressed by nonhuman biological categories (e.g., ‘‘body
parts’’ and ‘‘birds’’). This result is consistent with previous
reports that PPA most strongly represents information about
outdoor scenes and buildings (Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998).NeFigure 2B shows category selectivity for a second voxel
located in the right precuneus (PrCu) of subject A.V. The model
shows that BOLD responses are strongly enhanced by
categories associated with social settings (e.g., people, commu-
nication verbs, and rooms) and suppressed by many other
categories (e.g., ‘‘building,’’ ‘‘city,’’ ‘‘geological formation,’’ and
‘‘atmospheric phenomenon’’). This result is consistent with an
earlier finding that PrCu is involved in processing social scenes
(Iacoboni et al., 2004).
A Semantic Space for Representation of Object and
Action Categories
We used principal components analysis (PCA) to recover a
semantic space from the category model weights in each
subject. PCA ensures that categories that are represented by
similar sets of cortical voxels will project to nearby points in the
estimated semantic space, while categories that are represented
very differently will project to different points in the space. To
maximize the quality of the estimated space, we included only
voxels that were significantly predicted (p < 0.05, uncorrected)
by the categorymodel (see Experimental Procedures for details).
Because humans can perceive thousands of categories
of objects and actions, the true semantic space underlyinguron 76, 1210–1224, December 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 1211
Figure 2. Category Selectivity for Two Individual Voxels
Each panel shows the predicted response of one voxel to each of the 1,705 categories, organized according to the graphical structure of WordNet. Links indicate
‘‘is a’’ relationships (e.g., an athlete is a person); some relationships used in the model are omitted for clarity. Eachmarker represents a single noun (circle) or verb
(square). Red markers indicate positive predicted responses and blue markers indicate negative predicted responses. The area of each marker indicates pre-
dicted response magnitude. The prediction accuracy of each voxel model, computed as the correlation coefficient (r) between predicted and actual responses, is
shown in the bottom right of each panel along with model significance (see Results for details).
(A) Category selectivity for one voxel located in the left hemisphere parahippocampal place area (PPA). The category model predicts that movies will evoke
positive responses when ‘‘structures,’’ ‘‘buildings,’’ ‘‘roads,’’ ‘‘containers,’’ ‘‘devices,’’ and ‘‘vehicles’’ are present. Thus, this voxel appears to be selective for
scenes that contain man-made objects and structures (Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998).
(B) Category selectivity for one voxel located in the right hemisphere precuneus (PrCu). The category model predicts that movies will evoke positive responses
from this voxel when ‘‘people,’’ ‘‘carnivores,’’ ‘‘communication verbs,’’ ‘‘rooms,’’ or ‘‘vehicles’’ are present and negative responses when movies contain
‘‘atmospheric phenomena,’’ ‘‘locations,’’ ‘‘buildings,’’ or ‘‘roads.’’ Thus, this voxel appears to be selective for scenes that contain people or animals interacting
socially (Iacoboni et al., 2004).
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sions. However, given the limitations of fMRI and a finite stimulus
set, we expect that we will only be able to recover the first few
dimensions of the semantic space for each individual brain and
fewer still dimensions that are shared across individuals. Thus,
of the 1,705 semantic PCs produced by PCA on the voxel
weights, only the first few will resemble the true underlying
semantic space, while the remainder will be determined mostly
by the statistics of the stimulus set and noise in the fMRI data.
To determine which PCs are significantly different from
chance, we compared the semantic PCs to the PCs of the cate-
gory stimulus matrix (see Experimental Procedures for details of
why the stimulus PCs are an appropriate null hypothesis). First,
we tested the significance of each subject’s own categorymodel
weight PCs. If there is a semantic space underlying category
representation in the subject’s brain, then we should find that
some of the subject’s model weight PCs explainmore of the vari-
ance in the subject’s category model weights than is explained
by the stimulus PCs. However, if there is no semantic space
underlying category representation in the subject’s brain, then
the stimulus PCs should explain the same amount of variance1212 Neuron 76, 1210–1224, December 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Incin the category model weights as do the subject’s PCs. The
results of this analysis are shown in Figure 3. Six to eight PCs
from individual subjects explain significantly more variance in
category model weights than do the stimulus PCs (p < 0.001,
bootstrap test). These individual subject PCs explain a total of
30%–35% of the variance in category model weights. Thus,
our fMRI data are sufficient to recover semantic spaces for indi-
vidual subjects that consist of six to eight dimensions.
Second, we used the same procedure to test the significance
of group PCs constructed using data combined across subjects.
To avoid overfitting, we constructed a separate group semantic
space for each subject using combined data from the other four
subjects. If the subjects share a common semantic space, then
some of the group PCs should explain more of the variance in the
selected subject’s category model weights than do the stimulus
PCs. However, if the subjects do not share a common semantic
space, then the stimulus PCs should explain the same amount of
variance in the categorymodel weights as do the group PCs. The
results of this analysis are also shown in Figure 3. The first four
group PCs explain significantly more variance (p < 0.001, boot-
strap test) than do the stimulus PCs in four out of five subjects..
Figure 3. Amount of Model Variance Ex-
plained by Individual Subject and Group
Semantic Spaces
Principal components analysis (PCA) was used to
recover a semantic space from category model
weights in each subject. Here we show the vari-
ance explained in the category model weights by
each of the 20 most important PCs. Orange lines
show the amount of variance explained in cate-
gory model weights by each subject’s own PCs
and blue lines show the variance explained by PCs
of combined data from other subjects. Gray lines
show the variance explained by the stimulus PCs,
which serve as an appropriate null hypothesis (see
text and Experimental Procedures for details).
Error bars indicate 99% confidence intervals (the
confidence intervals for the subjects’ own PCs and
group PCs are very small). Hollow markers indi-
cate subject or group PCs that explain significantly
more variance (p < 0.001, bootstrap test) than the stimulus PCs. The first four group PCs explain significantly more variance than the stimulus PCs for four
subjects. Thus, the first four group PCs appear to comprise a semantic space that is common across most individuals and that cannot be explained by stimulus
statistics. Furthermore, the first six to nine individual subject PCs explain significantly more variance than the stimulus PCs (p < 0.001, bootstrap test). This
suggests that while the subjects share broad aspects of semantic representation, finer-scale semantic representations are subject specific.
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ance, 72% as much as do the first four individual subject PCs.
In contrast, the first four stimulus PCs only explain 10% of the
total variance, 38% as much variance as the individual subject
PCs. This result suggests that the first four group PCs describe
a semantic space that is shared across individuals.
Third, we determined how much stimulus-related information
is captured by the group PCs and full category model. For
each model, we quantified stimulus-related information by
testing whether the model could distinguish among BOLD
responses to different movie segments (Kay et al., 2008; Nishi-
moto et al., 2011; see Experimental Procedures for details).
Models using 4–512 group PCs were tested by projecting the
category model weights for 2,000 voxels (selected using the
training data set) onto the group PCs. Then, the projected model
weights were used to predict responses to the validation stimuli.
We then tried to match the validation stimuli to observed BOLD
responses by comparing the observed and predicted responses.
The same identification procedure was repeated for the full cate-
gory model.
The results of this analysis are shown in Figure S2. The full
category model correctly identifies an average of 76% of stimuli
across subjects (chance is 1.9%). Models based on 64 or more
group PCs correctly identify an average of 74% of the stimuli but
incorporate information that we know cannot be distinguished
from the stimulus PCs. A model based on the four significant
group PCs correctly identifies 49% of the stimuli, roughly two-
thirds as many as the full model. These results show that the
four-PC group space does not capture all of the stimulus-related
information present in the full category model, indicating that the
true semantic space is likely to have more than four dimensions.
Further experiments will be required to determine these other
semantic dimensions.
To visualize the group semantic space, we formed a robust
estimate by pooling data from all five subjects (for a total of
49,685 voxels) and then applying PCA to the combined data.NeVisualization of the Semantic Space
The previous results demonstrate that object and action cate-
gories are represented in a semantic space consisting of at
least four dimensions and that this space is shared across indi-
viduals. To understand the structure of the group semantic
space, we visualized it in two different ways. First, we projected
the 1,705 coefficients of each group PC onto the graph defined
byWordNet (Figure 4). The first PC (shown in Figure 4A) appears
to distinguish between categories that have high stimulus energy
(e.g., moving objects like ‘‘person,’’ ‘‘vehicle,’’ and ‘‘animal’’) and
those that have low stimulus energy (e.g., stationary objects like
‘‘sky,’’ ‘‘city,’’ ‘‘building,’’ and ‘‘plant’’). This is not surprising, as
the first PC should reflect the stimulus dimension with the great-
est influence on brain activity, and stimulus energy is already
known to have a large effect on BOLD signals (Fox et al., 2009;
Nishimoto et al., 2011; Smith et al., 1998).
We then visualized the second, third, and fourth group PCs
simultaneously using a three-dimensional (3D) colormap pro-
jected onto the WordNet graph. A color was assigned to each
of the 1,705 categories according to the following scheme: the
category coefficient in the second PC determined the value of
the red channel, the third PC determined the green channel,
and the fourth PC determined the blue channel (see Figure 4B;
see Figure S3 for individual PCs). This scheme assigns similar
colors to categories that are represented similarly in the brain.
Figure 4C shows the second, third, and fourth PCs projected
onto the WordNet graph. Here humans, human body parts, and
communication verbs (e.g., ‘‘gesticulate’’ and ‘‘talk’’) appear in
shades of green. Other animals appear yellow and green-yellow.
Nonliving objects such as ‘‘vehicles’’ appear pink and purple, as
do movement verbs (e.g., ‘‘run’’), outdoor categories (e.g., ‘‘hill,’’
‘‘city,’’ and ‘‘grassland’’), and paths (e.g., ‘‘road’’). Indoor cate-
gories (e.g., ‘‘room,’’ ‘‘door,’’ and ‘‘furniture’’) appear in blue
and indigo. This figure suggests that semantically related cate-
gories (e.g., ‘‘person’’ and ‘‘talking’’) are represented more simi-
larly than unrelated categories (e.g., ‘‘talking’’ and ‘‘kettle’’).uron 76, 1210–1224, December 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 1213
Figure 4. Graphical Visualization of the Group Semantic Space
(A) Coefficients of all 1,705 categories in the first group PC, organized according to the graphical structure of WordNet. Links indicate ‘‘is a’’ relationships (e.g., an
athlete is a person); some relationships used in the model have been omitted for clarity. Each marker represents a single noun (circle) or verb (square). Red
markers indicate positive coefficients and blue indicates negative coefficients. The area of each marker indicates the magnitude of the coefficient. This PC
distinguishes between categories with high stimulus energy (e.g., moving objects like ‘‘person’’ and ‘‘vehicle’’) and those with low stimulus energy (e.g., stationary
objects like ‘‘sky’’ and ‘‘city’’).
(B) The three-dimensional RGB colormap used to visualize PCs 2–4. The category coefficient in the second PC determined the value of the red channel, the third
PC determined the green channel, and the fourth PC determined the blue channel. Under this scheme, categories that are represented similarly in the brain are
assigned similar colors. Categories with zero coefficients appear neutral gray.
(C) Coefficients of all 1,705 categories in group PCs 2–4, organized according to theWordNet graph. The color of eachmarker is determined by theRGBcolormap
in (B). Marker sizes reflect the magnitude of the three-dimensional coefficient vector for each category. This graph shows that categories thought to be
semantically related (e.g., ‘‘athletes’’ and ‘‘walking’’) are represented similarly in the brain.
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space, we created an analogous figure in which category posi-
tion is determined by the PCs instead of theWordNet graph. Fig-
ure 5 shows the location of all 1,705 categories in the space
formed by the second, third, and fourth group PCs (Movie S1
shows the categories in 3D). Here, categories that are repre-
sented similarly in the brain are plotted at nearby positions. Cate-
gories that appear near the origin have small PC coefficients and
thus are generally weakly represented or are represented simi-
larly across voxels (e.g., ‘‘laptop’’ and ‘‘clothing’’). In contrast,
categories that appear far from the origin have large PC coeffi-
cients and thus are represented strongly in some voxels and
weakly in others (e.g., ‘‘text,’’ ‘‘talk,’’ ‘‘man,’’ ‘‘car,’’ ‘‘animal,’’
and ‘‘underwater’’). These results support earlier findings that
categories such as faces (Avidan et al., 2005; Clark et al.,
1996; Halgren et al., 1999; Kanwisher et al., 1997; McCarthy
et al., 1997; Rajimehr et al., 2009; Tsao et al., 2008) and text (Co-1214 Neuron 76, 1210–1224, December 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inchen et al., 2000) are represented strongly and distinctly in the
human brain.
Interpretation of the Semantic Space
Earlier studies have suggested that animal categories (including
people) are represented distinctly from nonanimal categories
(Connolly et al., 2012; Downing et al., 2006; Kriegeskorte et al.,
2008; Naselaris et al., 2009). To determine whether hypothesized
semantic dimensions such as animal versus nonanimal are
captured by the group semantic space, we compared each of
the group semantic PCs to nine hypothesized semantic dimen-
sions. For each hypothesized dimension, we first assigned a
value to each of the 1,705 categories. For example, for the
dimension animal versus nonanimal, we assigned the value +1
to all animal categories and the value 0 to all nonanimal cate-
gories. Then we computed how much variance each hypothe-
sized dimension explained in each of the group PCs. If.
Figure 5. Spatial Visualization of the Group Semantic Space
(A) All 1,705 categories, organized by their coefficients on the second and third
PCs. Links indicate ‘‘is a’’ relationships (e.g., an athlete is a person) from the
WordNet graph; some relationships used in the model have been omitted for
clarity. Eachmarker represents a single noun (circle) or verb (square). The color
of each marker is determined by an RGB colormap based on the category
coefficients in PCs 2–4 (see Figure 4B for details). The position of each marker
is also determined by the PC coefficients: position on the x axis is determined
by the coefficient on the second PC and position on the y axis is determined
by the coefficient on the third PC. This ensures that categories that are
represented similarly in the brain appear near each other. The area of each
marker indicates the magnitude of the PC coefficients for that category;
more important or strongly represented categories have larger coefficients.
The categories ‘‘man,’’ ‘‘talk,’’ ‘‘text,’’ ‘‘underwater,’’ and ‘‘car’’ have the largest
coefficients on these PCs.
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Nea hypothesized dimension provides a good description of one
of the group PCs, then that dimension will explain a large fraction
of the variance in that PC. If a hypothesized dimension is
captured by the group semantic space but does not line up
exactly with one of the PCs, then that dimension will explain vari-
ance in multiple PCs.
The comparison between the group PCs and hypothesized
semantic dimensions is shown in Figure 6. The first PC is best ex-
plained by a dimension that contrasts mobile categories (people,
nonhuman animals, and vehicles) with nonmobile categories.
The first PC is also well explained by a dimension that is an
extension of a previously reported ‘‘animacy’’ continuum (Con-
nolly et al., 2012). Our animacy dimension assigns the highest
weight to people, decreasing weights to other mammals, birds,
reptiles, fish, and invertebrates, and zero weight to all nonanimal
categories. The second PC is best explained by a dimension that
contrasts categories associated with social interaction (people
and communication verbs) with all other categories. The third
PC is best explained by a dimension that contrasts categories
associated with civilization (people, man-made objects, and
vehicles) with categories associated with nature (nonhuman
animals). The fourth PC is best explained by a dimension that
contrasts biological categories (animals, plants, people, and
body parts) with nonbiological categories, as well as a similar
dimension that contrasts animal categories (including people)
with nonanimal categories. These results provide quantitative
interpretations for the group PCs and show that many hypothe-
sized semantic dimensions are captured by the group semantic
space.
The results shown in Figure 6 also suggest that some hypoth-
esized semantic dimensions are not captured by the group
semantic space. The contrast between place categories (build-
ings, roads, outdoor locations, and geological features) and
nonplace categories is not captured by any group PC. This is
surprising because the representation of place categories is
thought to be of primary importance to many brain areas,
including the PPA (Epstein and Kanwisher, 1998), retrosplenial
cortex (RSC; Aguirre et al., 1998), and temporo-occipital sulcus
(TOS; Nakamura et al., 2000; Hasson et al., 2004). Our results
may appear different from the results of earlier studies of place
representation because those earlier studies used static images
and not movies.
Another hypothesized semantic dimension that is not cap-
tured by our group semantic space is real-world object size
(Konkle and Oliva, 2012). The object size dimension assigns
a high weight to large objects (e.g., ‘‘boat’’), medium weight to
human-scale objects (e.g., ‘‘person’’), a small weight to small(B) All 1,705 categories, organized by their coefficients on the second and
fourth PCs. Format is the same as (A). The large group of ‘‘animal’’ categories
has large PC coefficients and is mainly distinguished by the fourth PC. Human
categories appear to span a continuum. The category ‘‘person’’ is very close to
indoor categories such as ‘‘room’’ on the second and third PCs but different on
the fourth. The category ‘‘athlete’’ is close to vehicle categories on the second
and third PCs but is also close to ‘‘animal’’ on the fourth PC. These semanti-
cally related categories are represented similarly in the brain, supporting the
hypothesis of a smooth semantic space. However, these results also show
that some categories (e.g., ‘‘talk,’’ ‘‘man,’’ ‘‘text,’’ and ‘‘car’’) appear to bemore
important than others. Movie S1 shows this semantic space in 3D.
uron 76, 1210–1224, December 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 1215
Figure 6. Comparison between the Group
Semantic Space and Nine Hypothesized
Semantic Dimensions
For each hypothesized semantic dimension, we
assigned a value to each of the 1,705 categories
(see Experimental Procedures for details) and
we computed the fraction of variance that each
dimension explains in each PC. Each panel
shows the variance explained by all hypothesized
dimensions in one of the four group PCs.
Error bars indicate bootstrap SE. The first PC is
best explained by a dimension that contrasts
mobile categories (people, nonhuman animals,
and vehicles) with nonmobile categories and
an ‘‘animacy’’ dimension (Connolly et al., 2012)
that assigns high weight to humans, decreasing
weights to other mammals, birds, reptiles, fish,
and invertebrates, and zero weight to other
categories. The second PC is best explained by
a dimension that contrasts social categories
(people and communication verbs) with all other
categories. The third PC is best explained by
a dimension that contrasts categories associated
with civilization (people, man-made objects, and
vehicles) with categories associated with nature
(nonhuman animals). The fourth PC is best explained by a dimension that contrasts biological categories (people, animals, plants, body parts, and plant parts)
with nonbiological categories and a dimension that contrasts animals (people and nonhuman animals) with nonanimals.
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no size (e.g., ‘‘talking’’) or can be many sizes (e.g., ‘‘animal’’).
This object size dimension was not well captured by any of the
four group PCs. However, based on earlier results (Konkle and
Oliva, 2012), it appears that object size is represented in the
brain. Thus, it is likely that object size is captured by lower-vari-
ance group PCs that could not be significantly discerned in this
experiment.
Cortical Maps of Semantic Representation
The results of the PC analysis show that the brains of different
individuals represent object and action categories in a common
semantic space. Here we examine how this semantic space is
represented across the cortical surface. To do this, we first con-
structed a separate cortical flatmap for each subject using stan-
dard techniques (Van Essen et al., 2001). Then we used the
scheme described above (see Figure 4) to assign a color to
each voxel according to the projection of its category model
weights into the PC space (for separate PCmaps, see Figure S4).
The results are shown in Figures 7A and 7C for two subjects (cor-
responding maps for other subjects are shown in Figure S5).
(Readers who wish to explore these maps in detail, and examine
the category selectivity of each voxel, may do so by going to
http://gallantlab.org/semanticmovies.)
These maps reveal that the semantic space is represented in
broad gradients that are distributed across much of anterior
visual cortex (some of these gradients are shown schematically
in Figure S6). In inferior temporal cortex, regions of animal
(yellow) and human representation (green and blue-green) run
along the inferior temporal sulcus (ITS). Both the fusiform face
area and occipital face area lie within the region of human repre-
sentation, but the surrounding region of animal representation
was previously unknown. In a gradient that runs from the ITS1216 Neuron 76, 1210–1224, December 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inctoward the middle temporal sulcus, human representation gives
way to animal representation, which then gives way to represen-
tation of human action, athletes, and outdoor spaces (red and
red-green). The dorsal part of the gradient contains the extrastri-
ate body area and area MT+/V5 and also responds strongly to
motion (positive on the first PC, see Figures 7B and 7D).
In medial occipitotemporal cortex, a region of vehicle (pink)
and landscape (purple) representation sits astride the collateral
sulcus. This region, which contains the PPA, lies at one end of
a long gradient that runs across medial parietal cortex. Toward
RSC and along the PrCu, the representational gradient shifts
toward buildings (blue-indigo) and landscapes (purple). This
gradient continues forward along the superior bank of the intra-
parietal sulcus as far as the posterior end of the cingulate sulcus
while shifting representation toward geography (purple-red) and
human action (red). This long gradient encompasses both the
dorsal and ventral visual pathways (Ungerleider and Mishkin,
1982) in one unbroken band of cortex that represents a con-
tinuum of semantic categories related to vehicles, buildings,
landscapes, geography, and human actions.
This map also reveals that visual semantic categories are well
represented outside of occipital cortex. In parietal cortex, an
anterior-posterior gradient from animal (yellow) to landscape
(purple) representation is located in the posterior bank of the
postcentral sulcus (PoCeS). This is consistent with earlier reports
that movies of hand movements evoke responses in the PoCeS
(Buccino et al., 2001; Hasson et al., 2004) and may reflect
learned associations between visual and somatosensory stimuli.
In frontal cortex, a region of human action and athlete repre-
sentation (red) is located at the posterior end of the superior
frontal sulcus (SFS). This region, which includes the frontal eye
fields (FEFs), lies at one end of a gradient that shifts toward land-
scape (purple) representation while extending along the SFS..
Figure 7. Semantic Space Represented across the Cortical Surface
(A) The category model weights for each cortical voxel in subject A.V. are projected onto PCs 2–4 of the group semantic space and then assigned a color ac-
cording to the scheme described in Figure 4B. These colors are projected onto a cortical flatmap constructed for subject A.V. Each location on the flatmap shown
here represents a single voxel in the brain of subject A.V. Locations with similar colors have similar semantic selectivity. This map reveals that the semantic space
is represented in broad gradients distributed across much of anterior visual cortex. Semantic selectivity is also apparent in medial and lateral parietal cortex,
auditory cortex, and lateral prefrontal cortex. Brain areas identified using conventional functional localizers are outlined in white and labeled (see Table S1 for
abbreviations). Boundaries that have been inferred from anatomy or that are otherwise uncertain are denoted by dashed white lines. Major sulci are denoted by
dark blue lines and labeled (see Table S2 for abbreviations). Some anatomical regions are labeled in light blue (abbreviations: PrCu, precuneus; TPJ, tempor-
oparietal junction). Cuts made to the cortical surface during the flattening procedure are indicated by dashed red lines and a red border. The apex of each cut is
indicated by a star. Blue borders show the edge of the corpus callosum and subcortical structures. Regions of fMRI signal dropout due to field inhomogeneity are
shaded with black hatched lines.
(B) Projection of voxel model weights onto the first PC for subject A.V. Voxels with positive projections on the first PC appear red, while those with negative
projections appear blue and those orthogonal to the first PC appear gray.
(C) Projection of voxel weights onto PCs 2–4 of the group semantic space for subject T.C.
(D) Projection of voxel model weights onto the first PC for subject T.C. See Figure S5 for maps of semantic representation in other subjects.
Note: explore these data sets yourself at http://gallantlab.org/semanticmovies.
Neuron
Semantic Representation in the Human BrainAnother region of human action, athlete, and animal representa-
tion (red-yellow) is located at the posterior inferior frontal sulcus
(IFS) and contains the frontal operculum (FO). Both the FO and
FEF have been associated with visual attention (Bu¨chel et al.,
1998), so we suspect that human action categories might be
correlated with salient visual movements that attract covert
visual attention in our subjects.
In inferior frontal cortex, a region of indoor structure (blue),
human (green), communication verb (also blue-green), and text
(cyan) representation runs along the IFS anterior to the FO.
This region coincides with the inferior frontal sulcus face patch
(Avidan et al., 2005; Tsao et al., 2008) and has also been impli-
cated in processing of visual speech (Calvert and Campbell,
2003) and text (Poldrack et al., 1999). Our results suggest thatNevisual speech, text, and faces are represented in a contiguous
region of cortex.
Smoothness of Cortical Semantic Maps
We have shown that the brain represents hundreds of categories
within a continuous four-dimensional semantic space that is
shared among different subjects. Furthermore, the results shown
in Figure 7 suggest that this space is mapped smoothly onto the
cortical sheet. However, the results presented thus far are not
sufficient to determine whether the apparent smoothness of
the cortical map reflects the specific properties of the group
semantic space, or rather whether a smooth map might result
from any arbitrary four-dimensional projection of our voxel
weights onto the cortical sheet. To address this issue, we testeduron 76, 1210–1224, December 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 1217
Figure 8. Smoothness of Cortical Maps under the Group Semantic Space
To quantify smoothness of cortical representation under a semantic space, we first projected voxel category model weights into the semantic space. Second, we
computed the mean correlation between voxel semantic projections as a function of the distance between voxels along the cortical sheet. To determine whether
cortical semantic maps under the group semantic space are significantly smoother than chance, we computed smoothness using the same analysis for 1,000
random four-dimensional spaces. Mean correlations for the group semantic space are plotted in blue, and mean correlations for the 1,000 random spaces are
plotted in gray. Gray error bars show 99% confidence intervals for the random space results. Group semantic space correlations that are significantly different
from the random space results (p < 0.001) are shown as hollow symbols. For adjacent voxels (distance 1) and voxels separated by one intermediate voxel
(distance 2), correlations of group semantic space projections are significantly greater than chance in all subjects. This shows that cortical semantic maps under
the group semantic space are much smoother than would be expected by chance.
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are smoother than expected by chance.
In order to quantify the smoothness of a cortical map, we first
projected the category model weights for every voxel into the
four-dimensional semantic space. Then we computed the corre-
lation between the projections for each pair of voxels. Finally, we
aggregated and averaged these pairwise correlations based
on the distance between each pair of voxels along the cortical
sheet. To estimate the null distribution of smoothness values
and to establish statistical significance, we repeated this proce-
dure using 1,000 random four-dimensional semantic spaces
(see Experimental Procedures for details).
Figure 8 shows the average correlation between voxel projec-
tions into the semantic space as a function of the distance
between voxels along the cortical sheet. In all five subjects, the
group semantic space projections have significantly (p < 0.001)
higher average correlation than the random projections, for
both adjacent voxels (distance 1) and voxels separated by one
intermediate voxel (distance 2). These results suggest that
smoothness of the cortical map is specific to the group semantic
space estimated here. Because the group semantic space was
constructed without using any spatial information, this finding
independently confirms the significance of the group semantic
space.
Importance of Category Representation across Cortex
The cortical maps shown in Figure 7 demonstrate that much of
the cortex is semantically selective. However, this does not
necessarily imply that semantic selectivity is the primary function
of any specific cortical site. To assess the importance of
semantic selectivity across the cortical surface, we evaluated
predictions of the category model, using a separate data set1218 Neuron 76, 1210–1224, December 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Increserved for this purpose (Kay et al., 2008; Naselaris et al.,
2009; Nishimoto et al., 2011). Prediction performance was quan-
tified as the correlation between predicted and observed BOLD
responses, corrected to account for noise in the validation data
(see Experimental Procedures and Hsu et al., 2004).
Figure 9 shows prediction performance projected onto cortical
flat maps for two subjects (corresponding maps for other
subjects are shown in Figure S7). The category model accurately
predicts BOLD responses in occipitotemporal cortex, medial
parietal cortex, and lateral prefrontal cortex. On average, 22%
of cortical voxels are predicted significantly (p < 0.01 uncor-
rected; 19% in subject S.N., 20% in A.H., 26% in A.V., 26% in
T.C., and 21% in J.G.). The category model explains at least
20% of the explainable variance (correlation > 0.44) in an
average of 8% of cortical voxels (5% in subject S.N., 7% in
A.H., 10% in A.V., 12% in T.C., and 7% in J.G.). These results
show that category representation is broadly distributed across
the cortex. This result is inconsistent with the results of previous
fMRI studies that reported only a few category-selective regions
(Schwarzlose et al., 2005; Spiridon et al., 2006). (Note, however,
that the category selectivity of individual brain areas reported
in these previous studies is consistent with our results.) We
suspect that previous studies have underestimated the extent
of category representation in the cortex because they used static
images and tested only a handful of categories.
Figure 9 also shows that some regions of cortex that appeared
semantically selective in Figure 7 are predicted poorly. This
suggests that the semantic selectivity of some brain regions
is inconsistent or nonstationary. These inconsistent regions
include the middle precuneus, temporoparietal junction, and
medial prefrontal cortex. All of these regions are thought to
be components of the default mode network (Raichle et al.,.
Figure 9. Model Prediction Performance across the Cortical Surface
To determine how much of the response variance of each voxel is explained by the category model, we assessed prediction performance using separate
validation data reserved for this purpose.
(A) Each location on the flat map represents a single voxel in the brain of subject A.V. Colors reflect prediction performance on the validation data. Well-predicted
voxels appear yellow or white, and poorly predicted voxels appear gray. The best predictions are found in occipitotemporal cortex, the posterior superior
temporal sulcus, medial parietal cortex, and inferior frontal cortex.
(B) Model performance for subject T.C. See Figure S7 for model prediction performance in other subjects. See Table S3 for model prediction performance within
known functional areas.
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Semantic Representation in the Human Brain2001) and are known to be strongly modulated by attention
(Downar et al., 2002). Because we did not control or manipulate
attention in this experiment, the inconsistent semantic selectivity
of these regions may reflect uncontrolled attentional effects.
Future studies that control attention explicitly could improve
category model predictions in these regions.
DISCUSSION
We used brain activity evoked by natural movies to study how
1,705 object and action categories are represented in the human
brain. The results show that the brain represents categories in
a continuous semantic space that reflects category similarity.
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that the brain
efficiently represents the diversity of categories in a compactNespace, and they contradict the common hypothesis that each
category is represented in a distinct brain area. Assuming that
semantically related categories share visual or conceptual
features, this organization probably minimizes the number of
neurons or neural wiring required to represent these features.
Across the cortex, semantic representation is organized along
smooth gradients that seem to be distributed systematically.
Functional areas defined using classical contrast methods are
merely peaks or nodal points within these broad semantic gradi-
ents. Furthermore, cortical maps based on the group semantic
space are significantly smoother than expected by chance.
These results suggest that semantic representation is analogous
to retinotopic representation, in which many smooth gradients of
visual eccentricity and angle selectivity tile the cortex (Engel
et al., 1997; Hansen et al., 2007). Unlike retinotopy, however,uron 76, 1210–1224, December 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 1219
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representation are not known a priori and so must be derived
empirically.
Previous studies have shown that natural movies evoke wide-
spread, robust BOLD activity across much of the cortex (Bartels
and Zeki, 2004; Hasson et al., 2004, 2008; Haxby et al., 2011;
Nishimoto et al., 2011). However, those studies did not attempt
to systematically map semantic representation or discover the
underlying semantic space. Our results help explain why natural
movies evoke widely consistent activity across different individ-
uals: object and action categories are represented in terms of
a common semantic space that maps consistently onto cortical
anatomy.
One potential criticism of this study is that the WordNet
features used to construct the category model might have
biased the recovered semantic space. For example, the cate-
gory ‘‘surgeon’’ only appears four times in these stimuli, but
because it is a descendent of ‘‘person’’ in WordNet, surgeon
appears near person in the semantic space. It is possible (how-
ever unlikely) that surgeons are represented very differently from
other people but that we are unable to recover that information
from these data. On the other hand, categories that appeared
frequently in these stimuli are largely immune to this bias. For
example, among the descendents of ‘‘person,’’ there is a large
difference between the representations of ‘‘athlete’’ (which
appears 282 times in these stimuli) and ‘‘man’’ (which appears
1,482 times). Thus, it appears that bias due to WordNet only
affects rare categories. We do not believe that these consider-
ations have a significant effect on the results of this study.
Another potential criticism of the regression-based approach
used in this study is that some results could be biased by stim-
ulus correlations. For example, we might conclude that a voxel
responds to ‘‘talking’’ when in fact it responds to the presence
of a ‘‘mouth.’’ In theory, such correlations are modeled and
removed by the regression procedure as long as sufficient
data are collected, but our data are limited and so some residual
correlations may remain. However, we believe that the alter-
native—bias due to preselecting a small number of stimulus
categories—is a more pernicious source of error and misinter-
pretation in conventional fMRI experiments. Errors due to stim-
ulus correlation can be seen, measured, and tested. Errors due
to stimulus preselection are implicit and largely invisible.
The group semantic space found here captures large
semantic distinctions such as mobile versus stationary cate-
gories but misses finer distinctions such as ‘‘old faces’’ versus
‘‘young faces’’ (Op de Beeck et al., 2010) and ‘‘small objects’’
versus ‘‘large objects’’ (Konkle and Oliva, 2012). These fine
distinctions would probably be captured by lower-variance
dimensions of the shared semantic space that could not be
recovered in this experiment. The dimensionality and resolu-
tion of the recovered semantic space are limited by the quality
of BOLD fMRI and by the size and semantic breadth of the
stimulus set. Future studies that use more sensitive measures
of brain activity or broader stimulus sets will probably reveal
additional dimensions of the common semantic space. Further
studies using more subjects will also be necessary in order
to understand differences in semantic representation between
individuals.1220 Neuron 76, 1210–1224, December 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier IncSome previous studies have reported that animal and non-
animal categories are represented distinctly in the human brain
(Downing et al., 2006; Kriegeskorte et al., 2008; Naselaris
et al., 2009). Another study proposed an alternative: that animal
categories are represented using an animacy continuum (Con-
nolly et al., 2012), in which animals that are more similar to
humans have higher animacy. Our results show that animacy is
well represented on the first, and most important, PC in the
group semantic space. The binary distinction between animals
and nonanimals is also well represented but only on the fourth
PC.Moreover, the fourth PC is better explained by the distinction
between biological categories (including plants) and nonbiolog-
ical categories. These results suggest that the animacy con-
tinuum is more important for category representation in the brain
than is the binary distinction between animal and nonanimal
categories.
A final important question about the group semantic space is
whether it reflects visual or conceptual features of the cate-
gories. For example, people and nonhuman animals might be
represented similarly because they share visual features such
as hair, or because they share conceptual features such as
agency or self-locomotion. The answer to this question probably
depends upon which voxels are used to construct the semantic
space. Voxels from occipital and inferior temporal cortex have
been shown to have similar semantic representation in humans
and monkeys (Kriegeskorte et al., 2008). Therefore, these voxels
probably represent visual features of the categories and not
conceptual features. In contrast, voxels from medial parietal
cortex and frontal cortex probably represent conceptual features
of the categories. Because the group semantic space reported
here was constructed using voxels from across the entire brain,
it probably reflects a mixture of visual and conceptual features.
Future studies using both visual and nonvisual stimuli will
be required to disentangle the contributions of visual versus
conceptual features to semantic representation. Furthermore,
a model that represents stimuli in terms of visual and conceptual
featuresmight producemore accurate and parsimonious predic-
tions than the category model used here.EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
MRI Data Collection
MRI data were collected on a 3T Siemens TIM Trio scanner at the UC Berkeley
Brain Imaging Center using a 32-channel Siemens volume coil. Functional
scans were collected using a gradient echo-EPI sequence with repetition
time (TR) = 2.0045 s, echo time (TE) = 31 ms, flip angle = 70, voxel size =
2.24 3 2.24 3 4.1 mm, matrix size = 100 3 100, and field of view = 224 3
224 mm. We prescribed 32 axial slices to cover the entire cortex. A custom-
modified bipolar water excitation radio frequency (RF) pulse was used to avoid
signal from fat.
Anatomical data for subjects A.H., T.C., and J.G. were collected using a T1-
weighted MP-RAGE sequence on the same 3T scanner. Anatomical data for
subjects S.N. and A.V. were collected on a 1.5T Philips Eclipse scanner as
described in an earlier publication (Nishimoto et al., 2011).
Subjects
Functional data were collected from five male human subjects, S.N. (author
S.N., age 32), A.H. (author A.G.H., age 25), A.V. (author A.T.V., age 25), T.C.
(age 29), and J.G. (age 25). All subjects were healthy and had normal or cor-
rected-to-normal vision. The experimental protocol was approved by the.
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Berkeley.
Natural Movie Stimuli
Model estimation data were collected in 12 separate 10 min scans. Validation
data were collected in nine separate 10min scans, each consisting of ten 1min
validation blocks. Each 1 min validation block was presented ten times within
the 90 min of validation data. The stimuli and experimental design were iden-
tical to those used in Nishimoto et al. (2011), except that here the movies were
shown on a projection screen at 24 3 24 degrees of visual angle.
fMRI Data Preprocessing
Each functional run was motion corrected using the FMRIB Linear Image
Registration Tool (FLIRT) from FSL 4.2 (Jenkinson and Smith, 2001). All
volumes in the run were then averaged to obtain a high-quality template
volume. FLIRT was also used to automatically align the template volume for
each run to the overall template, which was chosen to be the template for
the first functional movie run for each subject. These automatic alignments
were manually checked and adjusted for accuracy. The cross-run transforma-
tion matrix was then concatenated to the motion-correction transformation
matrices obtained using MCFLIRT, and the concatenated transformation
was used to resample the original data directly into the overall template space.
Low-frequency voxel response drift was identified using a median filter with
a 120 s window and this was subtracted from the signal. The mean response
for each voxel was then subtracted and the remaining response was scaled to
have unit variance.
Flatmap Construction
Cortical surface meshes were generated from the T1-weighted anatomical
scans using Caret5 software (Van Essen et al., 2001). Five relaxation cuts
were made into the surface of each hemisphere and the surface crossing
the corpus callosum was removed. The calcarine sulcus cut was made at
the horizontal meridian in V1 using retinotopic mapping data as a guide.
Surfaces were then flattened using Caret5.
Functional data were aligned to the anatomical data for surface projection
using custom software written in MATLAB (MathWorks).
Stimulus Labeling and Preprocessing
One observer manually tagged each second of the movies with WordNet
labels describing the salient objects and actions in the scene. The number of
labels per second varied between 1 and 14, with an average of 4.2. Categories
were tagged if they appeared in at least half of the 1 s clip. When possible,
specific labels (e.g., ‘‘priest’’) were used instead of generic labels (e.g.,
‘‘person’’). Label assignments were spot checked for accuracy by two addi-
tional observers. For example labeled clips, see Figure S1.
The labels were then used to build a category indicator matrix, in which each
second of movie occupies a row and each category occupies a column. A
value of 1 was assigned to each entry in which that category appeared in
that second of movie and all other entries were set to zero. Next, the WordNet
hierarchy (Miller, 1995) was used to add all the superordinate categories
entailed by each labeled category. For example, if a clip was labeled with
‘‘wolf,’’ we would automatically add the categories ‘‘canine,’’ ‘‘carnivore,’’
‘‘placental mammal,’’ ‘‘mammal,’’ ‘‘vertebrate,’’ ‘‘chordate,’’ ‘‘organism,’’ and
‘‘whole.’’ According to this scheme the predictedBOLD response to a category
is not just the weight on that category but the sum of weights for all entailed
categories.
The addition of superordinate categories should improve model predictions
by allowing poorly sampled categories to share information with their WordNet
neighbors. To test this hypothesis, we compared prediction performance of
the model with superordinate categories to a model that used only the labeled
categories. The number of significantly predicted voxels is 10%–20% higher
with the superordinate category model than with the labeled category model.
To ensure that the PCA results presented here are not an artifact of the added
superordinate categories, we performed the same analysis using the labeled
categories model. The results obtained using the labeled categories model
were qualitatively similar to those obtained using the full model (data not
shown).NeThe regression procedure also included one additional feature that
described the total motion energy during each second of the movie. This
regressor was added in order to explain away spurious correlation between
responses in early visual cortex and some categories. Total motion energy
was computed as the mean output of a set of 2,139 motion energy filters
(Nishimoto et al., 2011), in which each filter consisted of a quadrature pair of
space-time Gabor filters (Adelson and Bergen, 1985; Watson and Ahumada,
1985). The motion energy filters tile the image space with a variety of preferred
spacial frequencies, orientations, and temporal frequencies. The total motion
energy regressor explained much of the response variance in early visual
cortex (mainly V1 and V2). This had the desired effect of explaining away corre-
lations between responses in early visual cortex and categories that feature
full-field motion (e.g., ‘‘fire’’ and ‘‘snow’’). The total motion energy regressor
was used to fit the category model but was not included in the model
predictions.
Voxelwise Model Fitting and Testing
The category model was fit to each voxel individually. A set of linear temporal
filters was used to model the slow hemodynamic response inherent in the
BOLD signal (Nishimoto et al., 2011). To capture the hemodynamic delay,
we used concatenated stimulus vectors that had been delayed by two, three,
and four samples (4, 6, and 8 s). For example, one stimulus vector indicates the
presence of ‘‘wolf’’ 4 s earlier, another the presence of ‘‘wolf’’ 6 s earlier, and
a third the presence of ‘‘wolf’’ 8 s earlier. Taking the dot product of this delayed
stimulus with a set of linear weights is functionally equivalent to convolution of
the original stimulus vector with a linear temporal kernel that has nonzero
entries for 4, 6, and 8 s delays.
For details about the regularized regression procedure, model testing, and
correction for noise in the validation set, please see the Supplemental Exper-
imental Procedures.
All model fitting and analysis was performed using custom software written
in Python, which made heavy use of the NumPy (Oliphant, 2006) and SciPy
(Jones et al., 2001) libraries.
Estimating Predicted Category Response
In the semantic category model used here, each category entails the presence
of its superordinate categories in the WordNet hierarchy. For example, ‘‘wolf’’
entails the presence of ‘‘canine,’’ ‘‘carnivore,’’ etc. Because these categories
must be present in the stimulus if ‘‘wolf’’ is present, the model weight for
‘‘wolf’’ alone does not accurately reflect the model’s predicted response to a
stimulus containing only a ‘‘wolf.’’ Instead, the predicted response to ‘‘wolf’’
is the sum of the weights for ‘‘wolf,’’ ‘‘canine,’’ ‘‘carnivore,’’ etc. Thus, to deter-
mine the predicted response of a voxel to a given category, we added together
the weights for that category and all categories that it entails. This procedure is
equivalent to simulating the response of a voxel to a stimulus labeled only with
‘‘wolf.’’
We used this procedure to estimate the predicted category responses
shown in Figure 2, to assign colors and positions to the category nodes shown
in Figures 4 and 5, and to correct PC coefficients before comparing them to
hypothetical semantic dimensions as shown in Figure 6.
Principal Components Analysis
For each subject, we used PCA to recover a low-dimensional semantic space
from category model weights. We first selected all voxels that the model pre-
dicted significantly, using a liberal significance threshold (p < 0.05 uncorrected
for multiple comparisons). This yielded 8,269 voxels in subject S.N., 8,626
voxels in A.H., 11,697 voxels in A.V., 11,187 voxels in T.C., and 9,906 voxels
in J.G. We then applied PCA to the category model weights of the selected
voxels, yielding 1,705 PCs for each subject. (In additional tests, we found
that varying the voxel selection threshold does not strongly affect the PCA
results.) Partial scree plots showing the amount of variance accounted for
by each PC are shown in Figure 3. The first four PCs account for 24.1% of vari-
ance in subject S.N., 25.9% of variance in A.H., 28.0% of variance in A.V.,
25.8% of variance in T.C., and 25.6% of variance in J.G.
Second, we tested whether the recovered PCs were different from what we
would expect by chance. For details of this procedure, please see the Supple-
mental Experimental Procedures.uron 76, 1210–1224, December 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Inc. 1221
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of many dimensionality reductionmethods. Sparse methods such as indepen-
dent components analysis and nonnegative matrix factorization can also be
used to recover the underlying semantic space. We found that these methods
produced qualitatively similar results to PCA on the data presented here. In this
paper, we present only PCA results because PCA is commonly used, easy to
understand, and the results are highly interpretable.
Stimulus Identification Using Category Model and Models Based on
Group PCs
To quantify the relative amount of information that can be represented by the
full category model and the models based on group PCs, we used the valida-
tion data to perform an identification analysis (Kay et al., 2008; Nishimoto et al.,
2011). For the full category model, we calculated log likelihoods of the ob-
served responses given predicted responses to the validation stimuli and
the fitted category model (Nishimoto et al., 2011). Here we declare correct
identification if the highest likelihood for aggregated 18 s (9 TR) chunks of
responses can be associated with the correct timings for thematched stimulus
chunks within ±1 volume (TR). In order to minimize the potential confound due
to nonsemantic stimulus features, we subtracted the prediction of the total
motion energy regressor from responses before the analysis.
To perform the identification analysis for models based on the group
PCs, we repeated the same procedures as above but using group PC
models. We obtained these models by voxelwise regression using the cate-
gory stimuli projected into the group PC space (see voxelwise model fitting
and principal component analysis in Experimental Procedures). In order to
assess variability in the performance measurements, we performed the iden-
tification analysis ten times, based on group PCs obtained using bootstrap
voxel samples.
To reduce noise, the identification analyses used only the 2,000 most
predictable voxels. Prediction performance was assessed using 10% of the
training data that we reserved from the regression for this purpose. Voxel
selection was performed separately for each model and subject.
Comparison between Group Semantic Space and Hypothesized
Semantic Dimensions
To compare the dimensions of the group semantic space to hypothesized
semantic dimensions, we first defined each hypothesized dimension as a
vector with a value for each of the 1,705 categories. We then computed the
variance that each hypothesized dimension explains in each group PC as
the squared correlation between the PC vector and hypothesized dimension
vector. To find confidence intervals on the variance explained in each PC,
we bootstrapped the group PCA by sampling with replacement 100 times
from the pooled voxel population.
We defined nine semantic dimensions based on previous publications and
our own hypotheses. These dimensions included mobile versus immobile, ani-
macy, humans versus nonhumans, social versus nonsocial, civilization versus
nature, animal versus nonanimal, biological versus nonbiological, place versus
nonplace, and object size. For the mobile versus immobile dimension, we as-
signed positive weights to mobile categories such as animals, people, and
vehicles, and zero weight to all other categories. For the animacy dimension
based on Connolly et al. (2012), we assigned high weights to people and inter-
mediate and low weights to other animals based on their phylogenetic
distance from humans: more distant animals were assigned lower weights.
For the human versus nonhuman dimension, we assigned positive weights
to people and zero weights to all other categories. For the social versus non-
social dimension, we assigned positive weights to people and communication
verbs and zero weights to all other categories. For the civilization versus nature
dimension, we assigned positive weights to people, man-made objects (e.g.,
‘‘buildings,’’ ‘‘vehicles,’’ and ‘‘tools’’), and communication verbs and negative
weights to nonhuman animals. For the animal versus nonanimal dimension,
we assigned positive weights to nonhuman animals, people, and body parts
and zero weight to all other categories. For the biological versus nonbiological
dimension, we assigned positive weights to all organisms (e.g., ‘‘people,’’
‘‘nonhuman animals,’’ and ‘‘plants’’), plant organs (e.g., ‘‘flower’’ and ‘‘leaf’’),
body parts, and body coverings (e.g., ‘‘hair’’). For the place versus nonplace
dimension, we assigned positive weights to outdoor categories (e.g., ‘‘geolog-1222 Neuron 76, 1210–1224, December 20, 2012 ª2012 Elsevier Incical formations,’’ ‘‘geographical locations,’’ ‘‘roads,’’ ‘‘bridges,’’ and ‘‘build-
ings’’) and zeroweight to all other categories. For the real-world size dimension
based on Konkle and Oliva (2012), we assigned a high weight to large objects
(e.g., ‘‘boat’’), medium weight to human-scale objects (e.g., ‘‘person’’), a small
weight to small objects (e.g., ‘‘glasses’’), and zero weight to objects that have
no size (e.g., ‘‘talking’’) and those that can be many sizes (e.g., ‘‘animal’’).
Smoothness of Cortical Maps under Group Semantic Space
Projecting voxel category model weights onto the group semantic space pro-
duces semantic maps that appear spatially smooth (see Figure 7). However,
these maps alone are insufficient to determine whether the apparent smooth-
ness of the cortical map is a specific property of the four-PC group semantic
space. If the categorical model weights are themselves smoothly mapped
onto the cortical sheet, then any four-dimensional projection of these weights
might appear equally as smooth as the projection onto the group semantic
space. To address this issue, we tested whether cortical maps under the
four-PC group semantic space are smoother than expected by chance.
First, we constructed a voxel adjacency matrix based on the fiducial cortical
surfaces. The cortical surface for each hemisphere in each subject was repre-
sented as a triangular mesh with roughly 60,000 vertices and 120,000 edges.
Two voxels were considered adjacent if there was an edge that connects
a vertex inside one voxel to a vertex inside the other. Second, we computed
the distance between each pair of voxels in the cortex as the length of the
shortest path between the voxels in the adjacency graph. This distance metric
does not directly translate to physical distance, because the voxels in our scan
are not isotropic. However, this affects all models that we test and thus will not
bias the results of this analysis.
Third, we projected the voxel category weights onto the four-dimensional
group semantic space, which reduced each voxel to a length 4 vector. We
then computed the correlation between the projected weights for each pair
of voxels in the cortex. Fourth, for each distance up to ten voxels, we
computed the mean correlation between all pairs of voxels separated by
that distance. This procedure produces a spatial autocorrelation function for
each subject. These results are shown as blue lines in Figure 8.
To determine whether cortical map smoothness is specific to the group
semantic space, we repeated this analysis 1,000 times using random semantic
spaces of the same dimension as the group semantic space. Random ortho-
normal four-dimensional projections from the 1,705-dimensional category
space were constructed by applying singular value decomposition to
randomly generated 4 3 1,705 matrices. One can think of these spaces as
uniform random rotations of the group semantic space inside the 1,705-
dimensional category space.
We considered the observed mean pairwise correlation under the group
semantic space to be significant if it exceeded all of the 1,000 random
samples, corresponding to a p value of less than 0.001.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes seven figures, three tables, Supplemental
Experimental Procedures, and one movie and can be found with this article
online at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2012.10.014.
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